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23 MJ 1 (2016) §1. CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AS LAW'S THEODICY PROBLEM For centuries, theologians have grappled with the theodicy paradox. Assuming that God is merciful and almighty, why is there evil on earth? For many critics, it follows that God is either not merciful, or not almighty. By contrast, sophisticated theologians have pleaded for the acceptance that the theodicy paradox as an 'impossible possibility'. 1 Instead of solving the paradox, they propose that people should seek to overcome evil and provide a quantum of solace to the suff erers. 2 Constitutional pluralism is constitutional theory's theodicy problem. 3 Some argue that where diff erent legal orders claim supremacy, logic requires one of them to be supreme and the others to succumb. 4 Th is article argues that this is a fallacy. One can leave the paradox unresolved and seek to operationalize it. Th e judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) in the Gauweiler case concerning the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme of the European Central Bank (ECB) devises a solution. 5 It relies on an idea which I call 'mutually assured discretion'. Th is idea applies to both vertical relationships between the European Union and domestic courts, and horizontal relationships between European institutions and the Court of Justice. Accordingly, the institutions of the European Union exercise their powers on the basis of competences and mandates which grant them some degree of discretion. Th e power of courts to review such discretion is limited. But at the same time, judicial review also involves discretion. It is up to the reviewing court to determine the applicable standard of review, and apply it to a given case. Th is mutually discretionary relationship instigates enough self-discipline in each actor to stabilize the respective relationships -not dissimilar to the logic of the Cold War, yet within a much more harmonious framework.
Th is article will fi rst provide an inductive, reconstructive elaboration of the idea of mutually assured discretion. Th e contours of the discretion of the European institutions, as well as the applicable standard of judicial review, are diff erent for horizontal and vertical relationships. Concerning the former, this article will elaborate on mutually assured discretion as it emerged in the case law of the Court of Justice concerning the judicial review of post-crisis measures (Section 2). Concerning the latter, this article will show that the Bananas 6 and Honeywell 7 decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht; FCC) follow a similar logic of mutually assured discretion (Section 3). Having thus carved out the idea of mutually assured discretion underlying the Gauweiler case, it will be argued that this approach is normatively preferable to others for constitutional pluralism in the European Union (Section 4). Th e FCC would be well advised to follow the logic of mutually assured discretion in the present post-crisis context, whether in the Gauweiler case or in future disputes concerning, for example, the legality of the ECB's participation in sovereign debt restructurings in the European Union (Section 5). §2. HORIZONTAL DISCRETION: THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EURO CRISIS
In the law of the European Union, the horizontal variant of mutually assured discretion describes the standard of review that the Court of Justice has developed for the measures taken in response to the Euro crisis by the ECB and the Member States. However, it is my understanding that this standard of review also has a potential for other situations. One might generally use it as a standard of review in situations where an institution of the Union enjoys some degree of independence from others, which judicial review of its measures may not undermine. Examples might include the relationship between the European institutions and regulatory agencies like the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 8 or the issue of the right of the European Parliament to access to classifi ed Council documents. 9 As the following analysis of the Pringle and Gauweiler cases will show, the horizontal variant of mutually assured discretion is usually characterized by a broadly framed legal mandate of the institution concerned, which stipulates a certain objective to be reached rather than specifi c acts to be taken. Judicial control is confi ned to a three-pronged test whether the institution in question (in the case at hand, the ECB) actually pursues the stipulated objective; whether it uses the right instruments for that purpose; and whether its measures are proportionate. 10 Th is horizontal variant of mutually assured discretion 6 BVerfG, Case 2 BvL 1/97 Bananas, BVerfGE 102. resembles the judicial review of administrative discretion on the domestic level, which is usually confi ned to the question whether the actor in charge by and large pursued the objectives underlying its mandate and the limits set by certain basic legal principles. 11
A. PRINGLE
For the greater part of its existence, the ECB has been a rare guest before the Luxembourg court. 12 Th e Court of Justice began developing its standard of review for ECB measures as unconventional fi scal and monetary policies unfolded in the aft ermath of the fi nancial crisis. 13 In Pringle, the Court of Justice developed important elements of its purposeoriented standard of review. In delineating the Union's exclusive competence in monetary policy from fi scal policy, the Court of Justice ruled that it is not by the specifi c properties of a certain measure that one may distinguish monetary from fi scal policy, but by the objective of a measure pursued. 14 Th e Court of Justice found that the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) aimed at the fi nancial stability of the Eurozone as a whole and thus pursued a diff erent objective which did not fall within the exclusive competence of the Union. 15 However, as Paul Craig rightly criticizes, this conclusion may have been drawn prematurely. Th e fi nancial stability of the Union as a whole being a precondition for price stability, one may also say that the ESM aims at price stability. 16 As Craig emphasized, the Court of Justice does not fully cling to its other premise, namely that monetary and fi scal policy mutually infl uence each other at least indirectly. 17 Craig suggests that the solution lies in the consideration that the ESM does not have the competence to set monetary policies such as interest and exchange rates. 18 It is thus the combination of policy objectives and the instruments used to realize them, which allows a meaningful and practicable delimitation of monetary and fi scal policies. From this viewpoint, the ESM clearly does not fall into the fi eld of monetary policy, given that it has the purpose of safeguarding the fi nancial stability of the Eurozone and its members 19 
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Th is object-instrument combination also needs to be used within strict limits, namely if there is a risk to the fi nancial stability of the Eurozone, if public debt in the respective Member State is sustainable, and subject to conditionality. 21 Eff ectively, these conditions boil down to some form of proportionality test: there needs to be a legitimate goal (fi nancial stability), the ESM facilities need to be the least restrictive measure (as a debt restructuring is not necessary), and conditionality ensures that such support has a certain political and economic price tag attached to it. Nevertheless, the Court of Justice does not call this a proportionality test, although it points out the signifi cance of these conditions for the legality of the ESM treaty under EU law, especially in light of the no-bailout provision of Article 125 TFEU, 22 which the ESM complements and transforms. 23 Th e reason for this might be that the proportionality principle stipulated in Article 5(4) TEU only applies to the exercise of the competencies of the EU. But in the opinion of the Court of Justice, the ESM Treaty does not fall within the competence of the EU, and the newly added Article 136(3) TFEU is only of declaratory character. 24 
B. GAUWEILER
Th e Gauweiler case continues this line of reasoning and further clarifi es the standard of review to be applied to ECB measures. 25 Advocate General Cruz Villalón clearly spelled out the test which ECB measures need to pass: objectives pursued, instruments used, and proportionality. 26 Again, the Court of Justice elaborates the limits of broadly phrased provisions in the primary law, which grant the ECB a wide margin of discretion, by a combination of their objectives, the instruments used, and a proportionality test. 27 Th e Court of Justice begins its review by taking a very close look at the objectives of the ECB's monetary policy mandate stipulated in Article 127(1) TFEU. Contrary to the FCC, 28 it fi nds that the ECB not only has the mandate to maintain price stability, but also to conduct a single monetary policy, that is, that the preservation of the integrity of the Eurozone is a legitimate objective of ECB policy. 29 Th is opinion fi nds textual support in Article 127(1) TFEU and Article 3(4) TEU. Th ey not only reveal the purposive character 21 Article 12, 13(1) of the ESM Treaty. of the ECB's monetary policy mandate, 30 but link it directly with the integration programme pursued by the Treaties.
According to the Court of Justice, the instruments the ECB intended to use for its OMT programme, outright transactions on the secondary market, clearly serve these objectives. 31 Th eir selective character does not take away their character as monetary policy instruments. Moreover, in line with Pringle, the Court of Justice points out that the eff ects of the OMT programme on fi scal policy would not suffi ce to disqualify it as monetary policy. 32 Th ese issues might only raise proportionality questions, which the Court of Justice addresses in the following.
Proportionality requires the Court of Justice to relate the instruments to the objectives pursued. Given the discretionary character of the ECB's monetary policy mandate, the Court of Justice does not try to replace the expertise of the ECB with its own. 33 Jürgen Stark, former ECB chief economist of the ECB, fi ercely criticized Advocate General Cruz Villalón for recommending this line of reasoning in his Opinion. 34 However, a legal review that respects the discretionary powers of the ECB by necessity requires accepting that diff erent economic views are legally permissible. Law needs to acknowledge that economics has its own rationality, and vice versa. 35 Otherwise, one would relegate the ECB to the ranks of an administrative unit at the service of the Court of Justice -or of the FCC.
Th is, however, does not amount to a denial of judicial scrutiny on the part of the Court of Justice. Instead of a full review, the proportionality test bears a largely procedural character. 36 Th e Court of Justice establishes that the ECB is under a duty to provide suffi cient reasons, which it derives mutatis mutandis from Article 296(2) TFEU. 37 What follows is a plausibility test in which the Court of Justice fi nds that the reasoning given by the ECB in support of its OMT programme is consistent and in line with certain features of the OMT programme such as its selective character and conditionality. Aft er this exhaustive analysis, the Court of Justice turns to an examination of the conformity of the OMT programme with Article 123 TFEU. Despite its relative brevity, the same pattern can be discerned here. Th e Court of Justice begins by exploring the objective of Article 123 TFEU, namely that of instilling sound budgetary policies in the Member States. 38 In that respect, the diffi cult question whether Article 123 TFEU also prohibits secondary market purchases which generate eff ects that are equivalent to those of primary market purchases -a position which some scholars 39 and the FCC 40 had stressed -also requires a consideration of ends and means, objectives and instruments. 41 Th e Court of Justice considers that secondary market purchases are not prohibited to the extent that they do not lessen the incentive of Member States to conduct sound budgetary policies. Whether that is the case with respect to the OMT programme reveals -againa look at the instrument used. Th e Court of Justice concludes that certain limitations and conditions attached to the OMT programme reduce moral hazard and instigate sound budgetary policies. 42 At this point, a conundrum arises. Th e Court of Justice does not explicitly carry out a proportionality test with respect to Article 123 TFEU. In light of the purpose of Article 5(4) TEU, to ensure the proportionality of EU measures, there is no reason to apply a proportionality to the positive competencies of the ECB stipulated in Article 127 TFEU, but not to the 'negative' competencies, or rather, to the limits of the 'positive' competences stipulated in Article 123 TFEU. In both cases, the goals pursued by the OMT programme must be weighed against other ends. However, I think that the Court of Justice's analysis of the limits and conditions of the OMT programme which are meant to reduce moral hazard eff ectively amounts to a kind of proportionality analysis. In any event, there would not have been many arguments left for the court to discuss in a separate proportionality analysis.
By way of an intermediate conclusion, one can say that the Court of Justice has developed a fairly consistent standard of judicial review of crisis-related measures of the ECB and the Member States. Th is standard lends itself for the review of measures of other independent agencies or institutions. It comprises a close scrutiny of the purposes of a mandate or competence, a check whether the instruments deployed serve that mandate, and an analysis whether the eff ects are proportionate to the objectives. One might call this the horizontal variant of mutually assured discretion: the Court of Justice accepts the discretion of the ECB by exercising judicial self-restraint, while the ECB recognizes the Court of Justice's power of review by providing reasons to the Court of Justice which the latter uses to take the ECB at its word and scrutinize independently, guided by legal, In vertical relationships, the discretion test works diff erently. It focuses on the question whether the European Union has put in place structures and procedures ensuring that the exercise of its powers stays within the defi ned limits of its competence and does not violate human rights. Added to this is a kind of proportionality test which provides a threshold. Domestic courts may only intervene where there is a manifest violation of the respective rules of competence or human rights guarantees. In contrast to horizontal relationships, vertical mutually assured discretion does not consider the concrete object and purpose of a measure and the instruments used. Rather, it is confi ned to an assessment whether the European Union has put in place adequate structures for ultra vires and human rights reviews. Th is diff erence accounts for the fact that the judicial review of the Union's public authority -whether discretionary or not -is to be carried out principally within the legal order of the European Union. Being located at some distance and in a diff erent legal order, domestic courts need to grant the Union, including the Court of Justice, a margin of discretion.
A. HUMAN RIGHTS
Th e horizontal variant of mutually assured discretion originates in the idea of judicial cooperation which the FCC has developed, initially, in its case law regarding the human rights review of EU law. Th e long road that led the FCC and the Court of Justice from Stauder to the Bananas decision testifi es to the willingness of the Court of Justice to put in place structures for the human rights review of EU law. 43 Th e FCC's decision in Bananas grants a wide margin of discretion to the Court of Justice -but at the time still in a wholly substantive sense. 44 Th e FCC did not satisfy itself with the 'discovery' of human rights in the EU legal order by the Court of Justice, and the development of a body of case law for their eff ective enforcement in EU law. Rather, it insisted that the standard of human rights protection needs to be substantively equivalent to the one granted under the German Basic Law. Otherwise, it would restart hearing complaints about human rights violations caused by EU law. Th is substantive approach is not (yet) fully capable of organizing a pluralistic constitutional setting. It would inevitably lead to legal confl icts in a Union where all Member States did the same and insisted on their specifi c human rights standard -a situation which the European Court of Human Rights only escapes by invoking the margin of appreciation doctrine. But it is well-known that the last chapter on the issue of human rights enforcement in the EU legal order has not been written. 45 B. ULTRA VIRES By contrast, the more recent case law concerning ultra vires acts of the EU resembles, mutatis mutandis, much more closely the rationale of the Court of Justice in horizontal situations of mutually assured discretion. It started with the Maastricht judgment, 46 was expanded in the Lisbon judgment, 47 and reached full blossom in the Honeywell judgment. Here, the FCC argued that the alleged ultra vires act needs to structurally aff ect the repartition of competencies in the EU legal order, and needs to be manifest. 48 Th e FCC based this decision on the insight that, when courts determine the limits of the Union's competence under the treaties, there is no single right solution. Th e Treaties stipulate the competence of the Union in broad, general terms. For this reason, before declaring an EU act ultra vires, domestic courts need to refer the case to the Court of Justice, which enjoys a certain margin of discretion to develop these provisions. 49 Conversely, the FCC claims discretion with respect to the standard of ultra vires review. Th ere are no objective criteria for determining manifest, structurally signifi cant transgressions of the competencies of the EU. 50 Such a mutually discretionary relationship instils self-discipline in each participant and allows courts in a pluralistic setting to establish a stable relationship among the respective legal orders, even though they might rationally disagree.
Seen from this perspective, it is deplorable that the request for preliminary decision in Gauweiler has been less cognizant of the possibility of rational disagreement and hence of the need for courts to grant each other some leeway. qualify as a manifest one. 51 In drawing this conclusion, the FCC did not simply exercise its discretion over the standard of judicial review and its application. Rather, it completely disregarded that Honeywell created the 'manifestness' test to allow for rational disagreement. Hence, it tried to tie the Court of Justice to its own interpretation, leaving it seemingly with no choice but to follow the suggestion of the FCC and interpret the OMT policy restrictively, 52 or to face the consequences of an overt confrontation. Th e lack of respect for mutually assured discretion destabilized relations among the two courts -and their respective legal orders. §4. MUTUALLY ASSURED DISCRETION AS A PREFERABLE APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM Th e foregoing analysis has provided a reconstruction of discretionary standards in horizontal and vertical relationships in the EU context. While horizontal relationships are characterized by goal-oriented reasoning that checks the objectives, instruments and proportionality of a measure, 53 the successful organization of vertical relationships relies rather on structures and their manifest modifi cation. Within these outer limits, an institution or the Court of Justice is free to act, subject only to the discretionary application of these standards by the Court of Justice or domestic courts, respectively. Th is understanding of mutually assured discretion sums up diff erent methods of diff erentiated integration of pluralistic legal orders. 54 It is not to be confused with discretion in a technical, administrative law-like sense, but discretion that is mindful of the need to recognize diverging rationalities and interpretations. As the preceding shows, mutually assured discretion is already a reality in EU law, not merely wishful thinking. 55 Th is section argues that mutually assured discretion is not only practical, but also normatively superior to a host of alternative approaches.
A. PRACTICALITY
Mutually assured discretion has a solid legal foundation in each of the legal orders or legal regimes concerned. 57 As concerns horizontal relationships on the EU level, mutually assured discretion fi nds a possible legal basis in the principle of mutual sincere cooperation in Article 13(2) TEU. 58 Th is principle fi nds a counterweight in the independence of the ECB according to Article 130 TFEU. Why should we suppose that this kind of pluralism actually functions in practice? Th e key lies in the uncertainty of the very standard of review applied. Th is brings me to the core of my argument: mutually assured discretion is indeed mutual -it does not only recognize the discretion of the ECB, or of the Court of Justice and the European institutions. Th at would be one-sided discretion. Rather, the broad, open-ended concepts that guide the standard of review, whether in its horizontal (objective, proportionality) or vertical variant (structural, manifest), give discretion to the reviewer who has to apply them to concrete cases. One can never be sure when and why the reviewer will be of the opinion that a certain measure is disproportionate, or that there is a manifest structural modifi cation. Th is uncertainty bears a destructive potential which, in the optimal case, stabilizes the whole relationship. It gives each actor a lot of power over the other so that each of them should have strong incentives not to test its own power. 'Th e point of having the nuclear option is that you don't actually have to use it.' 59 Th is is why domestic courts hardly pull the trigger and almost always comply with the Court of Justice, 60 which in turn has at times modifi ed its case law in ways that accommodated the concerns of domestic courts, especially relating to human rights.
Mutually assured discretion further benefi ts from common principles that generate mutual trust. Th ese principles are contained in the basic ideas of human rights, democracy, and rule of law, recognized in each composite legal order of the European Union. Th is is what distinguishes the EU not only from the situation of the Cold War, 61 but also from international law in a wider sense. Th e absence of a thick layer of shared convictions ('Lebenswelt') 62 might cause diffi culties for a system relying on mutually assured discretion because individual decisions of one actor will face contestations of a very principled nature once they reach another actor. 
B. NORMATIVE SUPERIORITY
Th ere is thus practical advantage in leaving ultimate theoretical questions open -one of the main features of constitutional pluralism in the European Union. 64 In fact, this kind of constitutional pluralism is deliberately agnostic if it comes to questions of normative superiority or primacy. 65 In the terms of the taxonomy of constitutional pluralisms suggested by Avbelj and Komarek, 66 mutually assured discretion may best correspond to what they call 'harmonious discursive constitutionalism', which accepts plurality in substance, but stresses the universality of procedure. 67 It demonstrates that constitutional pluralism is far from being an oxymoron -at least if one understands it as epistemic pluralism, that is, a plurality of views about the ultimate decision-maker, not an oxymoronic plurality of ultimate decision-makers. Th e consequence is that each actor is free to consider itself as the ultimate source of normativity, as long as it respects that others do the same. Th is raises several normative issues. I argue that mutually assured discretion as a form of constitutional pluralism is not just practically viable, but also normatively superior to other approaches to EU integration. 68 For this purpose, let us take a look at how this approach diff ers from others, most of which are of a substantive nature.
First, one could assume that the principle of conferred powers should lead to a repartition of competencies, at least in a vertical sense, that does not allow for serious confl icts. But given that this principle has been in place ever since the beginning, one might not only have second thoughts about its practical viability. Indeed, it is theoretically unsatisfactory because it ignores the vagueness of legal rules, especially purpose-oriented ones like the rules on the competence of the Union. In and of itself, the principle of conferred powers thus raises questions which it is not able to answer, especially not in the context of a Union with an evolutionary character. 69 Th is is a fortiori true for the non-exclusive competencies of the EU. Th e principle of subsidiarity is notoriously vague and feeble. Perhaps it is only through mutually assured discretion that one can expect the Union to truly respect subsidiarity and proportionality in the exercise of its nonexclusive competences, in accordance with Article 5(3) and (4) TEU. In a hierarchical setting like a federal state, a vague standard like subsidiarity oft en enough has little teeth to resist centripetal forces. 70 A variation of this approach distinguishes policy fi elds where the EU enjoys broader, open-ended competences, from more specifi c functions of the EU which are to be narrowly interpreted. Granted, this distinction has some support in EU law. 71 However, fi elds can be very broad and vague at times, so that it might only be possible to determine whether a certain measure relates to a specifi c fi eld if one also takes into consideration the specifi c function of that measure. Th e problem is that many measures are highly interrelated, just like fi scal and monetary policy. 72 Second, one could argue that recognizing the hierarchical superiority of the EU level and the Court of Justice would better ensure the equality of the Member States, 73 while the supremacy of national constitutional law would enhance the integrity of domestic constitutional law. 74 However, from a viewpoint of constitutional pluralism, such solutions appear to be normatively unsatisfactory. Th ey require one side to succumb. It is either the unity of EU law, or the integrity of domestic constitutions which will inevitably suff er, depending on which level one deems to be hierarchically superior. If one accepted EU law as superior then well-known problems affl icting the democratic legitimacy of the Union would not disappear. Th e Union would lose the democratic 'relief valve' provided by domestic judicial review. Instead, mutually assured discretion carries a normative idea resembling Halbersam's constitutional pluralism characterized by voice and right, 75 or Howse's and Nicolaidis' suggestion that a democratic version of global governance should recognize that sovereignty is divisible and establish a democratic ethos of 'otherregardingness' for the relations between diff erent constituencies. 76 Th ird, while the idea of constitutional identity also provides a safety valve for sensitivities of domestic constituencies or courts, mutually assured discretion is normatively preferable. Th e concept of constitutional identity has developed a short but speedy career over the past few years. 77 I would not criticize the resort to constitutional 70 identity merely because it is a highly vague and subjective concept. 78 Mutually assured discretion is no less vague a standard. One might criticize the concept of constitutional identity because it appears to be relatively rigid. Indeed, its purpose is to set a counterpoint to the steady, incremental transformation of the European and domestic legal orders through practice. An open society needs this capacity for change, and the EU epitomizes the concept of an open society. But as Walter and Vordermayer have emphasized, the constitutional identity is itself a fl exible notion. It has seen dramatic changes in the recent past as it can now be taken to comprise the idea of European integration. 79 In such an understanding, constitutional identity is only a relative, comparative notion, not an absolute given. 80 Nevertheless, the problem with the concept of constitutional identity -which distinguishes it sharply from mutually assured discretion -is its one-sidedness. Constitutional identity only allows one part of the game to 'pull the plug', that is, the domestic level. It is not based on a reciprocal relationship that ensures equality of the arms. Th ere is almost no way of contesting the identity of another actor. Th e identity of a community is by defi nition determined by the community and its members. 81 Th at does not mean that identity is not an inter-subjective concept. It certainly changes through inter-subjective interaction, whether with members of the community or non-members. But it is a characteristic, defi ning feature of identity claims that they do not need to be justifi ed to anyone outside the community. Consequently, while EU law recognizes the national identity of the Member States, 82 their constitutional identity is not a European concept. 83 Another factor is that claims of identity can lead to a stalemate, once we widen our perspective for a more complex picture including other actors than just the FCC and the Court of Justice. If several Member States make confl icting invocations of constitutional identity, integration becomes a long-distance goal. Th is might eff ectively render the principle of conferred competencies and primacy of EU law powerless.
Only if one translates constitutional identity into requirements concerning the participation of domestic actors it might change from a unilateral to a more pluralistic notion. Th e insistence of the FCC on a strong role for domestic parliaments might provide an example; 84 a position which the FCC confi rmed in a number of EuroCrisis-related decisions. 85 It introduces a structural criterion which does not preempt any decision in favour of a substantive domestic law standard. But a merely procedural approach has its own problems. 86 In fact, it would replace the uncertainty involved in the application of substantive standards with more formal criteria that eff ectively disempower the domestic level.
To sum up, the comparative disadvantage of these alternative approaches to European integration is that they rely either on substantive notions on which we may rationally disagree, or on formal criteria which lack the uncertainty involved in mutually assured discretion. In this situation, mutually assured discretion lends itself as a standard that sits in the middle between substantive and procedural standards, an open standard of control that still has some teeth because it allows both actors to keep each other in check -in other words, a standard that leaves the question of theodicy unresolved and fi nds practical solutions to open questions. §5. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FCC IN GAUWEILER AND OTHER CASES Th e standard of mutually assured discretion is thus a viable way of making constitutional pluralism work. It does not subscribe to the superiority of one actor over the others. One may only speculate how the FCC will decide the Gauweiler case, but it would be well-advised to follow this line of thinking. Th is implies that the FCC, in its upcoming decision, may well continue to insist that it has the ultimate say. But it should accept that both the ECB and the Court of Justice enjoy discretion in the exercise of their mandate. Consequently, the FCC should not examine whether the Court of Justice has given the one and only 'correct' answer to the questions submitted, but rather examine whether the Court of Justice has overstepped the limits of the horizontal variant of mutually assured discretion by not scrutinizing the ECB closely enough. I anticipate that it will become diffi cult to accuse the Court of Justice of a manifest, structurally signifi cant failure to keep the ECB in check. In fact, in its judgment, has meticulously tackled each argument raised by the FCC and given responses with which one might rationally disagree, but which never appear as entirely far-fetched or arbitrary to qualify as manifest transgressions. Th e FCC might fi nd a face-saving solution that spares it the humiliation of recognizing the position taken in its referral as erroneous by distinguishing two diff erent standards of 'manifest' transgressions of EU powers: a stricter one to be applied at the time of the referral (whose strictness is partly justifi ed by Article 267 TFEU, which ties the admissibility of a referral to its necessity for a judgment), and a less strict one, to be applied when reviewing the answers of the Court of Justice. Such a solution may entail repercussions for other cases in the present post-crisis context. Quantitative Easing is, of course, an obvious candidate, 87 and so is the recent case against the ECB for its cessation of liquidity assistance aft er the announcement of the Greek referendum. 88 Another issue which created much confusion during the dramatic time surrounding the Greek referendum of summer 2015 is the question whether the ECB may voluntarily participate in a Greek sovereign debt restructuring. Some claimed that it could not, on top of problematic claims that the restructuring of debt owed to the ESM or to other Member States would violate Article 125 TFEU. 89 Th e FCC demanded that the ECB exclude participation in a sovereign debt restructuring regarding bonds purchased under its OMT programme. Th is would bring the programme in line with the Treaties. 90 Th ere are not only many reasons of international law militating against such a view, such as an emerging principle of debt sustainability as well as considerations of good faith and creditor equality. 91 Th is view also seems to contradict the idea of mutually assured discretion. Certainly, Article 123 TFEU does not allow for monetary fi nancing, that is, for fi scal policy in monetary disguise. 92 But as long as the objective of any participation in sovereign debt restructuring remains a monetary one, and as long as the instruments used are capable to reach this monetary policy objective and proportionate, participation in a bailout should be possible under the idea of mutually assured destruction. As regards the monetary policy objective, it could well be argued that participation in a bailout would, as the case may be, save the European Monetary 
